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LEADERSHIP AFTER A TORNADO STRIKE:  
SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT TRIAGE  
 
GREGORY E. BENSON1 
UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA AT 
KEARNEY 
SUSAN M. JENSEN 
UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA AT 
KEARNEY 
ABSTRACT 
An F2 tornado had tracked less than 100 feet from the Caldwin manufacturing plant, the largest 
producer of an essential engine value train component in the United States. Bob, Materials 
Manager at the plant and a member of the senior management team, was at home when the evening 
storm hit. Bob immediately headed to the plant when he received word of the emergency situation. 
On his way to the factory a rush of questions nearly overwhelmed him.  How bad was the situation?  
How prepared was his team of employees to handle the situation?    What should customers and 
suppliers be told about the situation?  How could Bob best provide the leadership needed in this 
situation?   
Keywords: supply chain management, logistics, disaster recovery, emergency response, risk 
assessment, leadership  
INTRODUCTION2 
As he cautiously drove to the Caldwin plant, Bob swerved his pickup to avoid downed trees 
and other wreckage on the streets. He dreaded what he might discover upon his arrival.  Just 
minutes earlier, a series of tornadoes had swept through the area and demolished hundreds of trees 
and buildings, tossed empty grain bins as if they were toys, and knocked down power lines 
throughout the region. The tornado that hit the plant facility was rated a high-end EF-2, with winds 
estimated at up to 135 miles per hour.  Bob had been home when the storm hit and was relieved to 
learn that all employees at the plant had been safely evacuated before the worst of the tornadoes 
reached the plant.  However, Bob grew increasingly worried as he drove by the fairgrounds that 
had been reduced to rubble, and saw that the airplanes and hanger at the regional airport, which 
was less than a mile from the Caldwin plant, were demolished.  At that point, the road became 
impassable and Bob parked his pickup and walked the remaining distance to the plant.  This was 
not Bob’s first experience with natural disasters, but when he saw the power lines draped over 
Caldwin’s perimeter chain-link security fence, and the gaping holes left where loading dock doors 
had been sucked out by the winds, he knew this was the most complicated leadership challenge he 
had ever faced. 
                                                          
1 Correspondence regarding this case study should be addressed to: 
Greg Benson, Department of Marketing/Agribusiness/SCM; University of Nebraska at Kearney, WSTC Room 
145W, Kearney, NE, 68849; bensonge@unk.edu; Phone 308-865-8022. 
2 This case is developed solely as a basis for class discussions.  Names and some data have been modified or 
disguised to protect the privacy of the protagonists. The case is not intended to serve as endorsements or illustrations 
of effective or ineffective management. 
3 Submitted: 26 Feb 2020;     Revised: 19 May 2020;    Accepted: 21 May 2020 
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Bob’s mind raced as he considered what actions needed to be taken.  As Materials Manager 
for Caldwin, Bob was on the plant’s senior management team and a member of the plant’s 
Emergency Response Team (EMT).  The EMT’s role was to provide leadership during times of 
plant emergency. This was definitely an emergency.  Bob was responsible for leading the efforts 
of his team as they carried out their duties associated with shipping, receiving, purchasing, 
production scheduling, inventory management, off-site warehouse storage, and the plant’s 
maintenance, repair, and operations (MRO) stockroom. Bob and his team of 24 employees had the 
immediate responsibility of figuring out answers to a myriad of questions, such as: 
• How quickly and effectively could power be restored to the plant?   
• When and how could plant operations get back online?    
• How could the plant place orders and receive needed raw materials and MRO supplies?   
• How could the plant ship finished products to their customers?   
• How and what should customers and suppliers be told about the situation?    
Bob also knew that his team would be looking to him to provide direction and a sense of order 
amidst the chaos.   
CALDWIN:  BEFORE THE TORNADO 
When the tornado hit, Caldwin was the largest manufacturer of an essential engine value train 
component (referred hereafter as “component”) in the United States.  These components were used 
in the automotive, trucking, and agriculture industries. 
The Caldwin plant operated 24 hours a day, six days per week, and produced over 60 unique 
component designs during the course of a month.  The plant had four component production lines, 
and each line produced an average of 45,000 components per eight-hour shift unless there was a 
product changeover.  A changeover (changing from the current component design being made to 
a different component design) typically took two to four hours from the time it began until the new 
component design came off the production line and was ready to be packaged for shipment.  The 
Caldwin plant typically had five to seven days of finished goods inventory on hand (in total 
inventory dollars), but that did not mean there were five to seven days of inventory available to 
ship for each of the 60 different types of components produced. Each unique component produced 
was typically scheduled to be made every two weeks, with a typical manufacturing production run 
size between 100,000 to 300,000 components. 
Seven truckloads of steel bars were delivered to the plant every day, Monday through Friday.  
Steel deliveries were not made on weekends unless some type of supply emergency existed.  The 
steel receiving area at the plant used an electric overhead crane to unload the flatbed trucks used 
to deliver the bundles of bar-steel to the plant.  Arriving trucks drove through a 24-foot overhead 
door into the receiving area.  Each steel truck carried approximately 44,000 pounds of steel bars, 
packaged in bundles, with each bundle weighing nearly 1,500 pounds.   
Each day fifteen to eighteen truckloads of components were shipped from the Caldwin plant 
to their original equipment manufacturer (OEM) customers across the United States and around 
the world.  Each truck was loaded with twenty-four to thirty pallets of components, depending on 
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the pallet size required by the customer.  Each shipment required the printing of all necessary 
paperwork, such as the bill of lading (BOL) and packing slip before the shipment could be loaded 
on a truck for shipment. An advanced shipping notice (ASN) had to be transmitted to the customer 
as the truck left the dock. 
There were three primary customers for Caldwin components.    Customers’ plant locations 
that used Caldwin components are as follows: 
• TCB Corporation (three locations: Mobile, AL; Austin, TX; Portland, OR) 
• AML Inc. (four locations: Brookings, SD; Grand Rapids, MI; Columbus, OH; Ashville, 
NC) 
• MLW Company (three locations: Cheyenne, WY; Boise, ID; Fargo, ND)   
Nearly 100% of all components used in TCB’s operations came from Caldwin; AML relied on 
Caldwin for about 65% of all their components; and MLW purchased approximately 30% of their 
components from Caldwin.  Each of these primary customers had agreements with Caldwin that 
included a penalty clause associated with any late product shipment that resulted in an assembly 
plant shutdown.  The penalty would be payable by Caldwin and averaged $75,000 per hour for 
each hour that a component assembly line at TCB, AML, or MLW was shut down due to Caldwin’s 
failure to ship product on time.   
As one of the largest employers in the region, the Caldwin plant at Plainville had 900 full-time 
employees who earned an average hourly wage rate of twenty dollars per hour plus generous 
benefits.  The plant’s seven senior managers (of which Bob was one) reported directly to the plant 
manager (See Figure 1).  The Caldwin’s plant’s Emergency Management Team (EMT) consisted 
of the plant manager and the plant manager’s seven direct reports.  
Figure 1.  Caldwin Plant Senior Management Team Organizational Chart 
 
The Caldwin plant was located on the outskirts of Plainville, a Midwestern town with a 
population of approximately 40,000 people located near a heavily traveled interstate highway.  As 
shown in Exhibit A, the facility included the primary manufacturing building, along with receiving 
and shipping docks and an employee parking lot surrounded by a security fence. Access to the 
plant was provided by four gates via Industrial Avenue on the west side of the plant.  A single gate 
on the south side of the Caldwin property provided access to a busy, four-lane public highway.  
This south gate was usually closed, but it could be used in the event of an emergency.  An electric 
motor opened the south gate, but the gate could also be manually opened.  Once through the south 
Plant Manager
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gate, a car could turn onto a one-lane service road that led to the main parking lot on the west side 
of the property, but anything larger than a pickup truck was unable to make the tight turn  needed 
to access the shipping and receiving dock areas. 
The shipping area of the plant had two electric overhead doors.  The 24-foot overhead door 
faced the south, and when opened, allowed a truck to back up to the plant’s single truck loading 
dock located inside the building.  The second overhead door faced the west; it was eight feet high 
and was typically used only by forktrucks to go outside and retrieve wooden pallets as needed 
from the pallet storage area.   The MRO receiving dock area was separate from the shipping dock 
area.  The MRO receiving dock also had a 24-foot electric overhead door that when opened, 
allowed a truck to back into the receiving dock located inside the building.   Forktrucks used in 
the shipping and MRO receiving areas had lights on the “fork side” of the forktruck that allowed 
the driver to see what they were doing when loading or unloading pallets inside a truck.  
A small emergency generator for the Caldwin plant provided power to items connected to the 
emergency power circuit, such as emergency lighting that enabled employees to safely exit the 
manufacturing area, and it powered the mainframe computer located in the accounting office.  The 
overhead doors in the shipping and receiving areas were not connected to the plant’s emergency 
power circuit, nor were the shipping and receiving areas lighting systems that were needed to 
safely carry out shipping or receiving activities.   
Caldwin rented 50,000 square feet of public warehouse space from GEB.  The GEB warehouse 
was located about a quarter mile west of the Caldwin manufacturing plant (See Appendix A), and 
the rented storage area (which was on the northwest side of the GEB building) included the use of 
two loading docks and one entry area with a garage door opening sufficient in size for use of a 
forktruck.  One Caldwin employee (a member of the Materials Department team) worked in GEB 
warehouse.  This employee had an office located at the warehouse equipped with a telephone, 
computer connected to the Caldwin plant’s computer system, and a printer.   On the east side of 
the GEB warehouse building was a large (approximately 14.5 acre) graveled public access parking 
lot, owned by GEB.  The parking lot was seldom used and could be accessed from the highway 
via a one-lane service road.  There was also a fifth wheel flatbed trailer (owned by Caldwin) 
capable of hauling three pallets of components that was always parked in the evening at the GEB 
parking lot.   
THE AFTERMATH OF THE TORNADO 
Once Bob finally reached the Caldwin plant, he took stock of the damage.  High voltage 
electrical power lines were knocked down, leaving the plant without power.  In addition, the power 
lines were draped over the plant’s chain-link security fence, as well as the four entrance gates that 
provided access to the three separate receiving and loading areas located on the west, north, and 
east sides of the plant.  In fact, all power poles along Industrial Avenue had been snapped, causing 
all four gates to the plant’s employee parking lot and truck loading docks coming off Industrial 
Avenue to be blocked.  Until the power poles and power lines were safely removed by the power 
company, it was evident that no vehicles could travel through the west gates to enter or exit the 
plant.   
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Due to the downed power lines, there was no power at the Caldwin plant.  Ordinarily, the 
Caldwin plant had a peak electricity demand of eighteen megawatts (MW) and a monthly 
electricity consumption load of approximately 8.2 million kilowatt-hours (kWh).  Electricity was 
provided to the Plainville area by ABC Power Company, which had a corporate office located in 
Hill City, approximately 75 miles from Plainville. Bob had worked previously with the ABC 
Power Company during power emergency situations, so he knew who he needed to contact to 
discuss the seriousness of the present situation.  
Just eighteen months before the tornado strike, Bob had worked with James Cricket (CEO of 
ABC Power Company) when Plainville, and the surrounding area, was hit by a winter ice storm 
that took down all the power transmission lines servicing the area.  At that time, ABC informed 
Caldwin Manufacturing that it could take several months before full, uninterrupted electrical 
service would be restored to the plant.  Bob worked directly with Cricket during that experience 
to resolve the power supply issues caused by the ice storm, and thankfully, restoration of power 
only took sixty days.   
When dealing with the aftermath of that ice storm, Bob also had worked with AGKO, an 
emergency power solutions company, to rent generators and other supporting equipment.  By 
renting eighteen 1MW generators, power generation transformers, and additional equipment from 
AGKO, Caldwin had enough portable electrical power to operate at full capacity within four days 
of the ice storm damage.  At that time, it required twenty-four flatbed trucks to transport all the 
rented equipment (at an approximate cost of $3,000 per truck) to the plant, and then the same cost 
was incurred to transport the equipment away from the plant when the crisis ended.   The cost to 
rent all the needed equipment at that time was $175,000 per month.  The diesel fuel consumption 
(burn rate) to operate the generators was nearly 1,200 gallons per hour.   
Since the tornado  caused a massive power outage at the Caldwin plant, the shipping areas on 
the west side of the plant, the steel receiving area on the east side of the plant, and the receiving 
dock for MRO products on the west side of the plant were all without power and dark.  There were 
no windows in any of these areas.  There were overhead dock doors in each area typically opened 
by electrical motorized door openers.  These dock doors could be opened manually, but to do so 
required two people to manually open and close each door.   The computers used in the shipping 
and receiving areas were not on the emergency generator power circuit so they were also rendered 
inoperable by the power outage.  Bob had also been informed by Plainville police that Industrial 
Avenue was expected to be closed to all traffic except ABC Power Company trucks for at least the 
next seven days.  
THE CHALLENGE FOR BOB AND HIS TEAM 
After surveying the obvious visible damage, Bob called a small group of key members of the 
Materials team to meet him at the GEB warehouse in thirty minutes. While he waited for the group 
to arrive, Bob recalled a comment that a person he respected once told him many years ago: 
“Generous leaders have faith in others to succeed.  In turn, they receive tenfold loyalty, 
commitment, and a positive outcome.”  Bob had not realized the wisdom of the comment until that 
moment as he waited for the group to arrive so he could give them an update about the current 
emergency situation.  Once the group arrived at the warehouse, Bob explained that he needed them 
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to quickly come up with a carefully planned course of action to address the SCM-related 
emergency response needs during the next seventy-two hours.  Bob explained that he was going 
to be tied up for the next couple of hours with the plant’s EMT group on a conference call with the 
Corporate office, but as soon as the call was over, he would be back to meet with the Materials 
team to go over their plan. Bob provided the group with the following questions to consider as 
they worked on their response plan: 
• Who (Materials team members, raw material suppliers, electricity power providers, etc.) 
should be involved in the SCM triage effort?    
• What are the immediate action steps needed to be taken in this situation?   
• What criteria should be used to determine the priority of those actions?   
• Who are the key customers affected? 
• How and what should customers be told about the situation?     
• How should Caldwin respond to those customers’ concerns? 
• How could the plant place orders and receive needed raw materials and MRO supplies?   
• How could the plant ship finished components to their customers?   
As Bob left the group, he realized he needed to consider another important question: How can he 
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